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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
IVAN FOSSESIGURANI, 
PLAINTIFF,
v.
CITY OF BRIDGEPORT FIRE DEPARTMENT 
And JOHN O’MALLEY,
DEFNDANTS.
CIVIL ACTION NO. 
3:11-cv-752 (VLB)
OCTOBER 1, 2012
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT rDkt. #291
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by the 
Defendants, City of Bridgeport (“City”) and former fire commissioner John 
O’Malley (“O’Malley”). The Plaintiff, Ivan Fossesigurani, brought this suit alleging 
that he suffered unlawful employment discrimination on the basis of his disability 
in violation of the American with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 
12111 et seq. Plaintiff also brings state law claims for unlawful employment 
discrimination on the basis of his race and disability in violation of the 
Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (“CFEPA”), Conn. Gen. Stat. § 46a- 
60(a) et seq., defamation and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional 
distress. For the reasons stated hereafter, Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment is granted.
Facts and Procedural Background
The following facts are undisputed unless otherwise noted. Plaintiff is an 
assistant chief in the Bridgeport Fire Department. [Dkt. #29.] Def. Local Rule
AUTHENTICATED , 
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56(A)(1) Statement, ^2]. He has been employed by the department for 34 years. 
John O’Malley was a member of the Bridgeport Fire Commission (the 
“Commission”) from 2003 until June 2009. Id. at ^1. The Commission consisted 
of seven members appointed by the mayor. One of the associated duties of the 
Commission is to review the attendance records of all fire department personnel 
who are out of work for an extended period of time. Id. at ^3-4. In September 
and October 2008, Fire Chief Brian Rooney brought Plaintiff for an attendance 
review because he had been out of work for a significant period of time and 
because of his history of poor attendance. Id. at ^7. Fire Department records 
indicate that from 1990 through 2009, Plaintiff missed 938 work days. Id. at ^8. 
Since 2004, he has missed 430 work days. Id.
On April 24, 2009, O’Malley, an owner of a home delivery heating oil 
business, was called to a customer’s home in Bridgeport. Id. at ^9. When 
O’Malley arrived at his customer’s home, members of the Bridgeport fire 
department were on the scene. Id. at ^11. O’Malley asked the firefighters about 
the whereabouts of Lt. John Macnicholl. Id. at ^12. One firefighter told O’Malley 
that Macnicholl worked on another Engine. Id. Macnicholl had been previously 
terminated and then subsequently reinstated to employment with the fire 
department. Id. His termination related to a physical altercation that Macnicholl 
had with the Plaintiff a few years earlier. Id. O’Malley then stated that he would 
rather have one hundred Macnicholls than one “Conniving Ivan.” Id. Plaintiff 
learned about O’Malley’s “Conniving Ivan” statement from firefighter Tyler
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Moraes. Id. at ^15. Plaintiff asked the firefighters who had heard and witnessed 
O’Malley’s comment to write a statement for him of what occurred. Id. a
Plaintiff asserts that he suffers from hypertension as well as a back and 
neck injury. Id. at ^20. Plaintiff does not know what type of spinal injury he has. 
Id. at ^22.
Plaintiff testified in a deposition that the “Conniving Ivan” incident affected 
his ability to perform his duties as an employee of the Bridgeport Fire Department 
“in a lot of ways, mostly personal at home, and just everything that I was doing. I 
used to go out, and I was just staying home. And it just affected my personal life, 
it really affected me.” [Dkt. #29, Ex. B, Dep., p.36]. Plaintiff further testified that 
as a result of the incident he has not lost any salary from the City of Bridgeport 
salary nor has he lost any benefits associated with his job. Id. at p. 60.
Plaintiff also testified that he thinks he has lost prospects of future 
employment. He testified that “I wanted to retire and apply for these other jobs, 
just like our present fire chief is doing right now . . . Those option were, for me, 
because of these comments and — that he made, derogatory remarks towards 
me, and it’s gotten around all over the place, I feel that he hurt my chances of 
going into -  I shouldn’t even apply for these jobs, because my chances are none. 
He just -  he squashed my career, everything I worked for my whole career. One 
swipe of his tongue, he just took my legs out from under me.” Id. at 60-61. 
Plaintiff testified that he has only applied for a position in the department of 
police, traffic division, in Greenwich and that his application is still pending. Id. 
at 62-63. Plaintiff stated that he has not applied to any other positions beside the
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one at the Greenwich Police Department. Id. at 63. Plaintiff further testified that if 
the deputy chief position in the Bridgeport Fire Department becomes open and 
the city offers an exam, he would take the exam and apply. Id. at 63
Plaintiff asserts that as a result of O’Malley’s comment his reputation has 
been damaged. He testified that while at a Sear’s department store he 
encountered a Milford Firefighter who asked him who was Conniving Ivan. [Dkt. 
#36, Ex.A, Dep. p. 41 and Ex. E, Pl. Affidavit, ^18]. Plaintiff also states in an 
affidavit that “My reputation and good name has been harmed by these 
statements,”[t]hese statements have impeded my ability to interact and work with 
Firemen which I supervise,” and “[m]y ability to pursue further employment has 
been damaged by these statements.” [Dkt. #36, Ex. E, Pl. Affidavit, ^22 , 24-25].
Legal Standard
Summary judgment should be granted “if the movant shows that there is 
no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.’” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of 
proving that no factual issues exist. Vivenzio v. City of Syracuse, 611 F.3d 98, 106 
(2d Cir.2010). “In determining whether that burden has been met, the court is 
required to resolve all ambiguities and credit all factual inferences that could be 
drawn in favor of the party against whom summary judgment is sought.” Id., 
(citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 
L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Matsushita Electric Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)). “If there is any evidence in the 
record that could reasonably support a jury's verdict for the nonmoving party,
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summary judgment must be denied.” Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Hapag Lloyd 
Container Linie, GmbH, 446 F.3d 313, 315-16 (2d Cir.2006) (internal quotation 
marks and citation omitted).
“A party opposing summary judgment cannot defeat the motion by relying on 
the allegations in his pleading, or on conclusory statements, or on mere 
assertions that affidavits supporting the motion are not credible. At the summary 
judgment stage of the proceeding, Plaintiffs are required to present admissible 
evidence in support of their allegations; allegations alone, without evidence to 
back them up, are not sufficient.” Welch-Rubin v. Sandals Corp., No.3:03cv481, 
2004 WL 2472280, at *1 (D.Conn. Oct. 20, 2004) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted); Martinez v. State of Connecticut, No. 3:09cv1341 (VLB), 2011 
WL 4396704 at *6 (D. Conn. Sept. 21, 2011). Where there is no evidence upon 
which a jury could properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it 
and upon whom the onus of proof is imposed, such as where the evidence 
offered consists of conclusory assertions without further support in the record, 
summary judgment may lie. Fincher v. Depository Trust and Clearance Co., 604 
F.3d 712 (2d Cir. 2010).
Analysis
I. ADA Employment Discrimination Claims
Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants discriminated against him on the basis 
of his disability. To establish a prima facie case under the ADA1, a plaintiff must
1 The Court notes that the current version of the ADA incorporates the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (“ADAAA”) which introduced a new standard for
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show “(a) that his employer is subject to the ADA; (b) that he is disabled within 
the meaning of the ADA or perceived to be so by his employer; (c) that he was 
otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of the job with or without 
reasonable accommodation; and (d) that he suffered an adverse employment 
action because of his disability.” Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 134 
(2d Cir.2008).
ADA claims are analyzed using the burden-shifting framework set forth in 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If Plaintiff can 
establish a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the Defendants to proffer a 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. 
McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802. As this stage, Defendants need only proffer, not 
prove, the existence of a nondiscriminatory reason for their employment 
decision. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1981). 
“This burden is one of production, not persuasion, it can involve no credibility 
assessment.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 
(2000) (internal quotations omitted).
If a Defendant meets its burden of production, the burden shifts back to 
Plaintiff to show that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered by the 
Defendant is mere pretext for illegal employment discrimination. McDonnell, 411
evaluating whether an employee was “regarded as having such an impairment.” 
The ADAAA applies to Plaintiff’s claims as they arose after Jan. 1, 2009.
Although the ADAAA “substantially broadened the definition of a disability under 
the law,” Hutchinson v. Ecolab, Inc., No.3:09cv1848(JBA), 2011 WL 4542957, at *7 
(D. Conn. Sept. 28, 2011), this change is not pertinent to the Court’s analysis as 
the Defendants only argue on the motion for summary judgment that the Plaintiff 
failed to demonstrate that he suffered an adverse employment action.
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U.S. at 804. “Although the intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth 
under this framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times 
with the plaintiff.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 143.
Defendants argue that the Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he 
suffered an adverse employment action. An adverse employment action is a 
“materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of employment” and must 
be “more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job 
responsibilities.” Sanders v. N.Y.C. Human Res. Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 755 (2d 
Cir.2004) (quotation marks omitted); see also Davis v. NYC Dep’t of Educ., No. 10- 
CV-3812(KAM), 2012 WL 139255, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan.18, 2012) (applying same 
standard to an ADA claim). Examples of materially adverse changes in working 
conditions include “a termination of employment, a demotion evidenced by a 
decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, 
significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices ... unique to a 
particular situation.” Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation 
omitted).
Plaintiff argues that he suffered an adverse employment action because 
O’Malley’s “Conniving Ivan” comment damaged his reputation which impacted 
his ability to perform his job in the fire department which Plaintiff claims is a 
“‘para-military organization’ where hierarchy is essential for orders to be given in 
potentially life threatening situations.” [Dkt. #36, Pl. Opp. to Summary Judgment, 
p. 8-9]. Plaintiff argues that the Second Circuit’s decision in Lore v. City of
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Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127 (2d Cir. 2012) supports his claim that reputational damage 
can constitute an adverse employment action. However, Plaintiff misunderstands 
the Second Circuit’s holding in Lore. In Lore, the Second Circuit considered an 
appeal from a jury verdict in favor of plaintiff on an employment retaliation claim 
awarding damages for injury to her reputation. The Second Circuit merely 
reiterated that it is well established that damages from injury to one’s reputation 
are recoverable under Title VII. In Lore, the Second Circuit never considered the 
question of whether reputational damage alone could constitute an adverse 
employment action. Plaintiff also argues that he suffered an adverse employment 
action because “he lost the ability to successfully apply for job opportunities 
outside of the Bridgeport Fire Department.” [Dkt. #36, Pl. Opp. to Summary 
Judgment, p. 9].
It does not appear that reputational damage alone stemming from criticism 
of an employee constitutes an adverse employment action under the law. Courts 
have routinely held that negative evaluations alone without any other 
ramifications or diminution in the terms of employment do not constitute adverse 
employment actions. See, e.g., Tepperwien v. Entergy Nuclear Operations, 663 
F.3d 556, 571 (2d Cir.2011) (“[E]mpty verbal threats do not cause an injury, and 
therefore are not materially adverse actions, where they are unsupported by any 
other actions.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Weeks v. New 
York State (Div. of Parole), 273 F.3d 76, 86 (2d Cir. 2001) (criticism of an employee 
alone did not establish adverse employment action where the evidence did not 
“describe its effect or ramifications, how or why the effect would be serious,
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whether it went into any file, or even whether it was in writing”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101 (2002); 
Mabry v. Neighborhood Defender Serv., 769 F.Supp.2d 381, 393 (S.D.N.Y.2011) 
(“Negative evaluations or reviews, without accompanying tangible harm or 
consequences, do not constitute materially adverse action altering the conditions 
of employment”). Here, O’Malley’s comment can be considered akin to a negative 
evaluation or review of the Plaintiff. Consequently, his comment alone without 
any accompanying tangible harm or consequences which materially altered the 
condition of his employment cannot constitute an adverse employment action. 
Here, Plaintiff has failed to offer any evidence of tangible harm or a consequence 
stemming from O’Malley’s comment as it is undisputed that his pay, rank, and 
benefits were not altered. Indeed, Plaintiff testified that he did not lose salary or 
any benefits associated with his job. [Dkt. #29, Ex. B, Dep., p.36]. A reasonable 
juror could not conclude that O’Malley’s comment materially altered the condition 
of Plaintiff’s employment where he did not lose rank, pay, benefits or had 
diminished material responsibilities at his job.
Even assuming reputational damage alone could constitute an adverse 
employment action, Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence that his reputation was 
so damaged that the terms and conditions of his employment were effectively 
altered. Plaintiff mainly relies on his own conclusory assertions in his affidavit 
and deposition testimony to support his claim that his reputation was damaged 
by O’Malley’s comment. However, it is well established that at the summary 
judgment stage,“[t]he non-moving party may not rely on conclusory allegations
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or unsubstantiated speculation.” Scotto v. Alemas, 143 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 
1998). The only other evidence of reputational damage that Plaintiff offers 
besides his own beliefs and speculations is that a Milford Firefighter asked him 
who “Conniving Ivan” is. No reasonable fact-finder could conclude based on the 
Milford Firefighter’s comment that Plaintiff had suffered a materially adverse 
change in the terms and conditions of his employment. See Uddin v. City of New 
York, No.07Civ.1356(PAC)(DF), 2009 WL 2496270, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2009) 
(finding plaintiff has not offered evidence capable of showing that the posting of 
article constituted an adverse employment action as “plaintiff merely alleges the 
article caused damage to his reputation and thereby to his future career 
prospects, without supporting these allegations with any evidence in admissible 
form.”).
Moreover, although Plaintiff indicated that O’Malley’s comment affected his 
personal life greatly such that he no longer goes out but instead stays at home, 
subjective feelings cannot transform an act into an adverse employment action. 
An adverse employment action “must be viewed from the perspective of a 
reasonable employee” because the “standard for judging harm must be objective 
to avoid the uncertainties and unfair discrepancies that can plague a judicial 
effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective feelings.” Pacheco v. N.Y. 
Presbyterian Hosp., 593 F.Supp.2d 599, 627 (S.D.N.Y.2009) (citation omitted); see 
also Pimental v. City of New York, No.00CIV.325(SAS), 2002 WL 977535 at *4 
(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2002) (“An adverse employment action affects the terms, 
privileges, duration, or conditions of the plaintiff's employment and, for that
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reason, subjective feelings ... are not enough to transform the denial [of a transfer 
request] into an adverse employment action within the meaning of Title VII.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Garber v. New York City Police 
Dept., No. 95 Civ. 2516, 1997 WL 525396, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1997) (holding 
that “purely subjective feelings about a transfer which, by objective standards, 
did not negatively alter the terms and conditions of his employment in any 
respect” have no bearing on whether an adverse employment action occurred); 
Armfield v. Jacobson, No. 95-CV-4820, 1998 WL 427560, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 
1998) (Interference with “sleeping, therapy, eating and medication schedules are 
purely subjective matters that Title VII does not address.”). Consequently, 
Plaintiff’s subjective belief that he suffered an adverse employment action 
because the comment affected him personally is not enough to survive a 
summary judgment motion.
Actions which may result in the inability to secure future employment may 
be properly considered adverse employment actions in certain circumstances. 
See e.g., Vernon v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, 154 F.Supp.2d 
844, 855 (S.D.N.Y., 2001) (act resulting in potential inability to secure future 
employment could constitute an adverse act.); Tse v. UBS Financial Servs., Inc., 
568 F.Supp.2d 274, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (“Although [a] materially adverse change 
in working conditions must be more duptive than a mere inconvenience or an 
alteration of job responsibilities, an adverse employment action may be found 
where the action affects the employee's future employment opportunities.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Wiley v. Glassman, 511 F.3d 151,
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157 (D.C.Cir., 2007) (“An employment action may be sufficient to support a claim 
of discrimination if it results in materially adverse consequences affecting ... 
future employment opportunities such that a reasonable trier of fact could find 
objectively tangible harm.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The Plaintiff has failed to offer evidence beyond his own subjective beliefs 
and speculations that he lost the ability to successfully apply for job 
opportunities. It is well established that a plaintiff cannot defeat a motion for 
summary judgment “on the basis of conjecture or surmise.” Goenaga v. March of 
Dimes Birth Defects Found., 51 F.3d 14, 18 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Meiri v. Dacon, 
759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir. 1985) (“To allow a party to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment by offering purely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any 
concrete particulars, would necessitate a trial in all Title VII cases.”). Plaintiff has 
indicated that he has only applied for one position since O’Malley’s comment and 
that his application is still pending. Therefore he has not offered any evidence 
that he has applied and been routinely denied employment opportunities after 
O’Malley’s comment, nevertheless proven that he was not hired for those other 
positions because of O’Malley’s comment. Plaintiff’s bare assertion that he has 
lost prospects of future employment is clearly insufficient to demonstrate an 
adverse employment action. Chamberlin v. Principi, No. 02 Civ. 8357, 2005 WL 
1963942, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Aug.16, 2005) (finding that plaintiff had not shown an 
adverse employment action where there was no evidence that “his career 
opportunities within or without [his place of employment] were damaged as a 
result of [a] lowered [performance] evaluation”); Shrira v. State Univ. of New York
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at Buffalo, No.02-CV-296A, 2007 WL 1201580, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. April 23, 2007) 
(holding former employer’s delay in responding to charge filed by the employee 
with the Department of Human Rights cannot constitute an adverse employment 
action because no reasonable juror could find that the delay “sullied Plaintiff's 
reputation or had any negative or adverse effect on Plaintiff's ability to secure 
future employment.”); Frontline Communications Intern., Inc. v. Sprint 
Communications Co., 374 F.Supp.2d 368, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (Plaintiff’s “bare 
assertion that he has been prejudiced in his ability to secure employment is 
insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment.”); see also Probst v. 
Ashcroft, 25 Fed. Appx. 469, 472 (7th Cir.2001) (“Hypothetical possibilities are not 
materially adverse employment actions.”); Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 
F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001) (“[T]he asserted impact cannot be speculative and 
must at least have a tangible adverse effect on the plaintiff's employment.”); 
Aquilino v. University of Kansas, 268 F.3d 930, 936 (10th Cir.2001) (“Speculative 
harm does not constitute adverse employment action.”). Evening viewing the 
evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a reasonable juror 
could not find that O’Malley’s comment resulted in an objectively tangible harm to 
Plaintiff’s future employment opportunities. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate 
that he suffered an adverse employment action to establish a prima facie case of 
disability discrimination under the ADA. The Court therefore grants Defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s ADA employment discrimination 
claim.
II. ADA Hostile Work Environment Claim
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The Second Circuit has not yet decided whether the ADA provides a basis 
for a hostile work environment claim. Farina v. Branford Bd. of Educ., 458 Fed. 
Appx. 13, 16-17 (2d Cir. 2011). Assuming arguendo that the ADA does provide a 
basis, the record is devoid of evidence that the Defendants’ conduct was 
sufficiently continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of his work 
environment to maintain a claim for hostile work environment. The Court 
therefore assumes without deciding that a claim for hostile work environment can 
be predicated under the ADA. The Court will consequently look to Title VII 
caselaw on hostile work environment to assess Plaintiff’s claim. Under Title VII, it 
is unlawful for an employer to subject individuals to a discriminatory hostile or 
abusive work environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys. Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); 42 
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). To prove that a workplace is actionably “hostile” under 
Title VII, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he “subjectively perceive[d] the 
environment to be abusive;” (2) the conduct was so “severe or pervasive” that it 
created an “objectively hostile or abusive work environment”, meaning “an 
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive;” and (3) the 
conduct created an environment abusive to employees “because of their race, 
gender, religion or national origin.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22. Under the ADA, 
Plaintiff must presumptively demonstrate that the conduct created an 
environment abusive to employees because of their disabilities.
The Supreme Court has established a non-exhaustive list of factors 
relevant to determining whether a workplace is so severely or pervasively hostile 
as to support a Title VII claim. These include “the frequency of the discriminatory
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conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 
offensive utterance; whether the conduct unreasonably interfered with plaintiff's 
work; ... whether it unreasonably interferes with the employee's work 
performance^]” and “[t]he effect on the employee's psychological well-being[.]” 
Id. at 23.
To determine “whether an environment may be considered sufficiently 
hostile or abusive to support [a Title VII claim],” courts must consider “the totality 
of the circumstances.” Williams v. Westchester, 171 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir.1999) 
(citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23). The factors outlined above must be evaluated 
“cumulatively” so that the Court can “obtain a realistic view of the work 
environment.” Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106, 111 (2d Cir.1997) 
(citations omitted). This includes evaluating the “quantity, frequency, and 
severity” of the discriminatory incidents. Id. “In order to meet [his] burden, the 
plaintiff must show more than a few isolated incidents of racial enmity[.]”
Williams, 171 F.3d at 100. Instead, the plaintiff “must establish that his workplace 
was permeated with instances of racially discriminatory conduct such as 
‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult,’ such that ‘the environment 
would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or abusive.’ Id. 
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that the alleged conduct was sufficiently 
continuous and concerted to have altered the conditions of his work environment 
to maintain a claim for hostile work environment. Indeed, Plaintiff has identified a 
single incident of alleged disability enmity on the part of O’Malley who doesn’t
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regularly work with Plaintiff at the Bridgeport Fire Department. Courts in the 
Second Circuit have found that “[s]imple teasing, offhand comments, and 
isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory 
changes in the terms and conditions of employment.” Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 
258 F.3d 62, 76 (2d Cir, 2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Rios v. 
Buffalo and Fort Erie Public Bridge Authority, No.04-cv-375A, 2008 WL 657121, at 
*3 (W.D.N.Y. March 7, 2008) (finding that behavior complained of was “simply too 
infrequent and episodic to constitute a hostile work environment” where plaintiff 
identified “only about six specific instances of misconduct over a thirteen-year 
period of time”); Celestine v. Petroleos de Venezuella SA, 266 F.3d 343, 354 (5th 
Cir. 2001) (holding that eight incidents of racial harassment over a twenty-five 
month period were not sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work 
environment); Brown v. Coach Stores, Inc., 163 F.3d 706, 713 (2d Cir.1998) 
(occasional offensive racial comments are not sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
establish a hostile work environment); Hannon v. Wilson Greatbatch, Ltd, No.00- 
CV-0203e(F), 2002 WL 1012971, *7 (W.D.N.Y. April 24, 2002) (the “mere utterance 
of an epithet which engenders offensive feelings” is insufficient to sustain a 
hostile work environment claim. “For racist comments, slurs, and jokes to 
constitute a hostile work environment, there must be more than a few isolated 
instances of racial enmity, meaning that instead of sporadic racial slurs, there 
must be a steady barrage of opprobrious racial comments. Thus, whether racial 
slurs constitute a hostile work environment typically depends upon the quantity, 
frequency, and severity of those slurs, considered cumulatively in order to obtain
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a realistic view of the work environment.”) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted). Here, Plaintiff has complained of the mere utterance of a single 
comment by someone who was not his co-worker or direct supervisor. A single 
comment is insufficient to constitute a hostile work environment regardless of 
the fact that Plaintiff felt harassed and abused by that comment. To demonstrate 
a hostile work environment, Plaintiff must show that there was a steady barrage 
of opprobrious comments reflective of disability enmity and not a single incident. 
Even viewing the evidentiary record in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, a 
reasonable juror could not conclude that hostility towards disabilities was 
sufficiently severe and pervasive to create a hostile work environment. The Court 
therefore grants Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s ADA 
hostile work environment claim.
III. Remaining State Law Claims
Having granted summary judgment as to the federal law claims against the 
Defendants, the Court declines to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction over the 
Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims. “Supplemental or pendent jurisdiction is a 
matter of discretion, not of right. Thus, the court need not exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction in every case.” Nicholson v. Lenczewski, 356 F.Supp.2d 157, 165-66 
(D. Conn. 2005) (citing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 715-26 (1966)). 
“The federal court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction and hear a state 
claim when doing so would promote judicial economy, convenience and fairness 
to the litigants. The court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, 
however, when state law issues would predominate the litigation or the federal
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court would be required to interpret state law in the absence of state precedent. 
In addition, the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction where the 
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” Id. (citing 
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 
(1988) (“in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before 
trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction 
doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity-will point toward 
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims”).
Here, this case has only been pending since May, 2011. In addition, the 
Court has not had occasion to, and thus has not ruled on any prior substantive 
motions and therefore has not developed familiarity with any of the state law 
issues in this case. See Horton v. Town of Brookfield, No.CIV.A.3:98CV01834, 
2001 WL 263299, *9 (D. Conn. March 15, 2001) (“In balancing the factors in this 
case, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining 
claims. The case is two years old and nearly ready for trial. In addition, the court 
has ruled on various dispositive motions and developed familiarity with the 
issues in the case. However, none of the court's rulings have specifically 
addressed the remaining state law claims, and the court is not familiar with those 
claims.”). Since the remaining claims are purely state law claims, the Court 
declines to exercise jurisdiction over those claims. Those claims are dismissed 
without prejudice to re-filing in state court.
Conclusion
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For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ [Dkt. #29] motion 
for summary judgment. The Plaintiff’s state law claims are dismissed without 
prejudice to pursuing in state court. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment in 
favor of Defendants on Plaintiff’s federal law claims and close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
_______/s/____________
Hon. Vanessa L. Bryant 
United States District Judge
Dated at Hartford, Connecticut: October 1, 2012
